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Is All Punishment Local?
The Effects of Jurisdictional Context on Sentence Length
Abstract
Objectives: This paper investigates the extent to which contextual and individual factors
influence the length of prison sentences in California. Methods: The analysis applies a
hierarchical linear model to individual and county-level data. Results: Some characteristics of
the racial, organizational, and public safety environments are found to influence the length of
prison terms. Conclusions: The findings support the organizational maintenance perspective
and the idea of minority incarceration as a response to a perceived crime threat. Political
environment is not found to have a significant effect on sentence lengths, and the findings do not
support the racial threat hypothesis. The effects of contextual factors are more modest than
those of individual attributes including legally relevant variables such as offense severity, prior
record, parole status, and Three Strikes eligibility. African-American and younger offenders
receive longer sentences, but this effect is not found for Latinos. Substantive, methodological,
and policy implications are discussed.
The Effects of Individual and Contextual Factors on Felony Sentences
Many characteristics of criminal defendants and their offenses are known to influence
sentencing. A general consensus exists in the literature that legally relevant variables such as the
severity of the instant offense and the offender’s prior criminal record should, and do, explain
most of the variation in sentencing outcomes (Dixon 1995; Johnson 2006; Ulmer and Johnson
2004). Studies have also found links between criminal sentences and factors that are not directly
relevant to the crime or the offender’s record, such as defendants’ race, ethnic origin, gender, and
age (Engen et al. 2003; Bushway and Piehl 2001). Along with legally relevant and extralegal
offender-level variables, characteristics of the environments in which sentencing takes place may
1

also influence outcomes (Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Dixon 1995; Ulmer and Bradley 2006;
Ulmer and Johnson 2004). Furthermore, the effects of offender-level variables on sentences may
vary systematically from one context to another (Britt 2000; Kautt 2002).
Geographic disparity has been observed in the application of federal sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing policies such as “Three Strikes and You’re Out”
(Alschuler 2005; Bowers 2001). Recent research has found evidence that geographic variation in
sentencing outcomes is associated with characteristics of the local political, legal, and/or social
environments in which sentencing takes place (Johnson 2006; Helms and Jacobs 2002; Eitle et
al. 2002). This paper contributes to the discussion of contextual influences on sentencing by
using hierarchical linear models to measure and compare the influence of five theoreticallyinformed categories of “inputs” that are believed to influence the process of charging and
sentencing felony defendants. These are (1) administrative context, (2) political environment,
(3) local ethnic and racial demographic composition, (4) economic conditions, and (5) crime
context. The effects of many of the individual-level variables discussed above will be measured
as well. Interactions between contextual and individual-level variables are examined to
determine whether contextual factors influence certain groups of offenders differently.
Organizational Maintenance and Courtroom Administrative Context
According to the organizational maintenance perspective, members of courtroom work
groups share a common interest in the timely and efficient disposal of criminal cases, so
administrative factors such as the size, capacity, and caseload of a court system may influence
the sentences that these work groups hand down (Dixon 1995). Decision makers in courts with
heavier caseloads are likely to have less time and inclination to consider sentences outside
“normal” ranges (Johnson 2005). Some legal scholars observe that courtroom cultures,
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practices, and bureaucratization associated with large court systems are conducive to more
lenient sentencing (Eisenstein et al. 1988; Dixon 1995). Using data from Pennsylvania, Ulmer
and Johnson (2004) find that practical constraints such as jail capacity, and administrative factors
such as the ratio of cases to personnel, influence the decision to incarcerate but have a smaller or
no measurable effect on sentence length. The effects of court size and caseload on sentence
length are tested in this paper.
Political Responsiveness and Electoral Accountability
California’s Superior Court judges, who try criminal cases, are elected by the public in
the counties where they serve. District Attorneys are also elected county officials. Both judges
and D.A.s make decisions that affect sentencing outcomes, but because California’s determinate
sentencing structure strictly curtails judicial discretion, a convicted felon’s sentence is largely
determined by the nature and number of charges initially filed by the prosecuting attorney, and
whether the prosecutor recommends a departure from the recommended sentence for each
charge.1 It seems reasonable to believe that prosecutors and judges, like other politicians, are
motivated to respond to their constituents’ preferences as they carry out their work (Huber and
Gordon 2004; Gordon and Huber 2002). Furthermore, voters are likely to choose District
Attorneys and judges whose views coincide with their own. Because the decisions made by
D.A.s and judges lead to enormous consequences for the lives of defendants and other members
of society, it is important to understand the extent to which electoral incentives influence efforts
to seek just outcomes in the courtroom.

1

According to California’s determinate sentencing structure, each felony offense was associated with three
corresponding prison terms: a “normal” sentence, a longer term to be imposed only when there are aggravating
circumstances, and a shorter term to be applied only when mitigating circumstances were present (Judicial Council
of California 2007; Watson 2008).
3

In the following analysis, I test the effect of the political environment on sentence lengths
using Republican voter registration by county for 2004. Since the 1964 Presidential campaign,
the Republican Party has been associated with “law and order” and greater punitiveness towards
crime than the Democratic Party (Beckett 1997; Smith 2004). Thus, one might expect offenders
to receive longer prison sentences in counties with a greater proportion of Republican voters if
D.A.s and judges act in accordance with the preferences of their constituents. Some studies find
significant links between rates of incarceration and indicators of political context such as
Republican Party registration, the proportion of a state legislature that is Democratic or
Republican, and percentage voting Republican in a presidential election (Helms and Jacobs
2002; Huang et al. 1996; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Smith 2004). On the other hand, other
recent research, using multilevel methods, concludes that the percentage voting Republican
locally has no significant effect on either the odds of incarceration or sentence length (Johnson
2005; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Weidner et al. 2005).
Social Control and Racial and Ethnic Threat
Social and economic characteristics of the sentencing environment may also influence
decisions and outcomes. Critical theorists have proposed that prisons and other institutions are
used by those who possess social and political power as instruments to establish and maintain
social order and respond to perceived threats to that order (Foucault 1977). Three forms of the
social control/threat response concept (racial/ethnic, economic, and crime threat) will be tested in
the analyses that follow.
Researchers have found effects on sentence outcomes associated with the racial makeup
of the jurisdictions in which sentencing takes place (Johnson 2005, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson
2004). Racial threat theory proposes that the effect of race on social and political outcomes in a
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given location will vary depending on the relative sizes of the majority and minority populations
(Blalock 1967; Myers and Talarico 1987). In areas with small nonwhite populations, whites may
regard their political and social power as secure, but as the minority proportion of the population
increases, the perceived threat to existing arrangements may grow (Blalock 1967). The marginal
“threat” effect of minority population growth may decline when the nonwhite population reaches
a critical mass with substantial social and political influence of their own (Blalock 1967; Britt
2000; Taylor 1998). Thus, the relationship between nonwhite population size and its effect on
outcomes like sentence length might assume a curvilinear (inverse-U), rather than linear, shape.
In addition, the criminal justice response to perceived racial or ethnic threat may be either
targeted or broad. Increased perception of racial or ethnic threat may result in disproportionate
sentencing disparities for the specific group that constitutes the perceived threat (e.g. growth in
the black population may result in disparate treatment of blacks but not whites), or sentencing
may become more severe for all criminals. In studies of habitual offender sentencing in Florida,
Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck (1998) and Crawford (2000) find that sentencing disadvantage for
black defendants is greater in places where the black population is larger. Others find that a
proportionately larger African-American population is associated with greater use of prisons in
general (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Myers and Talarico 1987; Weidner et al. 2005). The
following analyses will test for linear and curvilinear, targeted and broad forms of racial and
ethnic threat effects.
Economic and Crime Threat
Similar reasoning suggests that the criminal justice system may be used to control a
perceived threat posed by economically disadvantaged populations (Britt 2000). Some studies
detect a positive relationship between incarceration rates and unemployment rates (Box and Hale
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1982, 1985; Chiricos and Delone 1992), though others have found that the relationship between
the two is weak or absent (Eitle et al. 2002; Jacobs and Helms 1996). A positive and significant
relationship between unemployment and the incarceration rate might have alternative
explanations unrelated to “economic threat.” For example, unemployed people might commit
more crimes, leading to higher rates of incarceration, or high rates of incarceration and
subsequent release may lead to larger populations of unemployed ex-felons in certain
neighborhoods. Sentence length, which is less likely to be tied directly to these alternative
explanations than incarceration rate, is used as the dependent variable here.
A parallel “crime threat” hypothesis suggests that higher crime rates may lead to harsher
criminal charging or sentencing in efforts by prosecutors or judges to curb crime, respond to the
public’s demands, or fulfill their own campaign promises to “get tough on crime” (Crow and
Johnson 2008; Ulmer et al. 2007). This hypothesis is tested as well, using the county violent
crime rate as an independent variable. Finally, prominent scholars have observed that crime
control efforts in the United States have often had disproportionate negative impacts on minority
populations, particularly African-Americans (Tonry 1995; Kennedy 1997; Mauer 2004; Chiricos
and Crawford 1995). Interactions between crime rate at the county level and race/ethnicity at the
individual level are tested to determine whether race-specific crime threat effects are present.
Data and Model
The analyses presented below are conducted using multilevel, or hierarchical, linear
models. The individual-level data were provided by the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Data are included for 93,033 male inmates from throughout
California. The dataset includes all male white, black, and Latino sentenced inmates housed in
CDCR correctional facilities on August 31, 2006, who entered prison for their most recent
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offense in the years 2002 through 2006 to serve sentences for violent, property, or drug offenses.
The county-level data, collected separately, include political, administrative, demographic,
economic, and crime variables corresponding to each of California’s 58 counties.
Data were available for all inmates housed in the prison system on August 31, 2006, but
the sample was narrowed to those who entered from 2002 to 2006 to reduce heterogeneity
associated with changes in county characteristics and sentencing policy over the years. Because
the data comprise a cross-section of inmates on a specific date, individuals who entered between
2002 and 2006 and completed their sentences before that date are omitted. Thus, the dataset
underrepresents the population with the shortest prison stays (between one and four years,
depending on when they entered). Because of a small number of extreme outliers, values from
601 to 1200 months were truncated to 600 months. Inmates serving life sentences are excluded
as well. The effect of these selection biases is to undersample the offenders who received the
most and least leniency in the courtroom. Therefore, estimates of sentencing disparities will be
imperfect; actual disparities may be greater than those observed using these data.
Ideally, a comprehensive study of sentencing would include information on offenders
from the arrest stage forward, including those who were not incarcerated. It would include data
on modes of conviction, all charges filed and dropped, and rates and reasons for departures from
the presumptive determinate sentence. Studies that use such data have been conducted in
Pennsylvania, Washington, Minnesota, and the federal system, which have sentencing
commissions that collect, analyze, and share courtroom data (examples include Engen et al.
2003; Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002; Johnson 2005; Kautt 2002; Steffensmeier et al. 1998).
However, this has not been possible in California, due to the paucity of publicly available court
data coupled with a strong culture of secrecy prevalent among prosecutorial offices (Davis 2007;
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Bibas 2006; Bandes 2006). Analysis of available inmate data can produce substantively
meaningful and methodologically sound findings about some aspects of sentencing, but one must
keep in mind limitations due to the patterns of over- and under-representation discussed above.
***Table 1 about here ***
Descriptive statistics for offender-level and county-level variables are displayed in Table
1. The dependent variable in the model is sentence length in months, converted to naturallogarithm form to offset the variable’s positively skewed distribution. This variable ranges from
8 to 600 months, with a mean of about 85 months and a median of 48 months.2
Several legally relevant independent variables are included in the model. These include
the primary offense for which each inmate was incarcerated (dummy variables representing 23
separate offense categories). About 44 percent of inmates were convicted of violent offenses, 27
percent for property offenses, and 29 percent for drug offenses. Parole status is operationalized
as a dummy variable coded 1 if the offender is a parolee convicted of a new offense (27 percent
of the cases), and another coded 1 if the offender was returned to custody for a parole violation
(13 percent), with non-parolees as the reference group (60 percent). A continuous variable
represents the total number of serious and violent prior convictions on the inmate’s past record
(ranging from 0 to 94, with 72 percent having no priors), and dummy variables indicate whether
the inmate was convicted as a “second striker” (24 percent of the sample) or “third striker” (2
percent) under California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law.3 Extralegal individual-level

2

California prisons are supposed to house individuals serving sentences of one year or longer. Those serving terms
of less than 12 months most likely received credit for time served in jail or are serving the remainder of a suspended
sentence after a parole revocation.
3
The Three Strikes law, which went into effect in 1994, requires a doubled sentence for any felony conviction if the
offender has one prior serious or violent offense (a “second striker”) and a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life if
the offender has two prior serious or violent offenses (a “third striker”). The phrase “serious or violent” refers to the
list of approximately 40 offenses and enhancements listed as “serious” in Penal Code Section 1192.7(c) or 23
offenses and enhancements categorized as “violent” in California Penal Code Section 667.5(c). The “serious” list
encompasses all of the offenses on the “violent” list, with a few minor differences.
8

variables include the inmate’s race or ethnicity and age. Twenty-eight percent are AfricanAmerican, 43 percent are Latino, and 29 percent non-Hispanic white.4 One-quarter of the
inmates are 14-24 years old, 72 percent are 25-54, and 3 percent are 55 and up. The county in
which the inmate’s latest conviction was adjudicated serves as the link between the individuallevel and county-level datasets.
In the county-level dataset, measures of courtroom administrative context include dummy
variables for small (1-20 judges in 2005) and large (100 or more judges) court systems, as well
as the number of cases per deputy district attorney to measure caseload. The racial and ethnic
threat hypotheses are operationalized using the percentages of each county’s population who are
African-American and Latino from the 2000 Census. Centered and squared values of these
terms are included to test whether the racial/ethnic threat effect has a curvilinear form, declining
or increasing at low or high values of each group’s share of the population.5 To describe the
political environment, the county dataset includes the proportion of registered voters who were
registered as Republican in 2005. The county unemployment rate from the year 2002 is included
to capture the economic threat effect, and the violent crime rate from the year 2002 represents
the crime threat. A correlation matrix of the county-level variables found only two significant
correlations, between the dummy variables for “small court system” and “large court system”
(Pearson’s correlation -0.395, p < 0.01) and between “small court system” and violent crime rate
(Pearson’s correlation -0.406, p < 0.01).
Analysis, Findings, and Discussion
4

Racial and ethnic categories are determined from inmate self-reports and intake officers’ observations. Individuals
whose race or ethnicity falls into a category other than white, black or Latino were removed from the data set.
Asian/Pacific Islander and Native American Indian inmates were originally included, but were dropped from the
data set because of the lack of significant findings associated with their small numbers.
5
To reduce collinearity between the linear and quadratic county-level African-American and Latino population
variables, centered and squared race/ethnicity variables were calculated by subtracting the mean value of each of
these variables from the value corresponding to each case, and then squaring the resulting term.
9

Model 1: Unconditional Model
The analysis begins with an unconditional hierarchical linear model, which includes the
natural-log of sentence length as the dependent variable, and no covariates at either Level 1
(offender level) or Level 2 (county level). The Level 2 variance term (τ = 0.015) is statistically
significant (p < .001), indicating variation in sentence lengths between counties, but the
intraclass correlation coefficient is 0.019, meaning that only 1.9 percent of the variance in
sentencing outcome is between counties, while the remaining explainable variance is associated
with individual-level case characteristics.6
Model 2: Individual-level Effects, Legally Relevant and Extralegal
When individual-level covariates corresponding to legally relevant factors (number of
serious or violent prior convictions, offense type, parole status, and second or third strike) and
extralegal variables (race/ethnicity, age, sex, and year incarcerated) are added to the model, each
of these covariates is statistically significant. The individual-level variance component (σ2)
shrinks considerably, from 0.75 in the unconditional model to 0.29. The individual-level
covariates explain 62 percent of the within-unit variance in sentence length, as determined using
a formula suggested by Kreft and de Leeuw (1998).7 The county-level variance component
becomes even smaller (τ = 0.0067), but it is still significant (p = 0.000) indicating that the
covariates included in this version of the model do not explain all of the county-to-county
variation in sentence length. About 55 percent of the between-unit variance is explained by the
individual-level covariates.8 A model comparison test using deviance statistics indicates
improvement in fit (χ2 = 89294, 32 d.f., p = 0.000) from Model 1 to Model 2. The results of
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Intraclass Correlation Coefficient = τ00 / (τ00 + σ2) = 0.0148 / (0.0148 + 0.75397) = 0.01925
(Unrestricted error – restricted error) / restricted error = (0.754 - 0.289)/0.754 = 0.617
8
(0.0148 - 0.0067)/0.0148 = 0.547
7
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Model 2 are summarized in Table 2, with antilogs of the estimated coefficients (eβ) shown in the
rightmost column to facilitate interpretation of each variable’s effect.
***Table 2 about here ***
Effects of Legally Relevant Variables
The parameter estimates associated with legally relevant variables are shown in the upper
part of Table 2. Offense severity and prior record are primary determinants of the punishment
received, which is consistent with the substantive rational legal perspective (Savelsberg 1992),
and prior scholarly research (Dixon 1995; Johnson 2006; Ulmer and Johnson 2004).
The results from Model 2 show that in comparison to the reference group, assault and
battery (as opposed to assault with a deadly weapon), all of the violent offenses have significant
positive coefficients (p = 0.000), with first- and second-degree murder, rape, and kidnapping
earning the longest sentences. Likewise, all of the property offenses except for first-degree
burglary (burglary of an inhabited residence) have statistically significant (p = 0.000) negative
coefficients corresponding to average sentence lengths about 25 to 26 percent shorter than the
average sentence for assault and battery. Among drug offenses, average sentences for
manufacture and sale of controlled substances are significantly longer than the sentence for
assault and battery, possession for sale of controlled substances is not statistically significant,
and all other drug-related offenses have significantly shorter sentences, with sentences for
possession the shortest. These findings appear to be consistent with the principles of
proportionality in sentencing, reflecting prison terms commensurate with offense severity.
The variables representing prior convictions, second- and third-striker status, and parole
status all have statistically significant effects in the expected directions at the p < 0.001 level. At
the mean values of the other variables in the model, each additional serious or violent prior
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offense on a defendant’s prior record is associated with a 3.6 percent increase in the length of the
prison term. Prior record is one of the criteria that judges may invoked to justify a decision to
exceed the presumptive determinate sentence. The effect of prior convictions is observed in
addition to the severe penalties imposed on felons who have “second striker” or “third striker”
status. Offenders who are incarcerated under the “second strike” provision of California’s Three
Strikes law earn sentences that are, on average, about 37 percent longer than they would have
received otherwise, and those who are imprisoned for a “third strike” must serve 25 years to life,
which is, on average, about 4.6 times longer than their sentences would be otherwise.
Inmates returned to prison on parole violations receive 16 percent shorter sentences than
non-parolee offenders. This is not surprising, as parole violations often do not involve new
felonies and violators can be ordered to complete previously suspended sentences rather than
receiving new, full sentences. In addition, parolees receive 2.4 percent shorter sentences even
when they must serve new prison terms. This may reflect their increased willingness to accept
plea offers in comparison to non-parolees, or prosecutors’ increased willingness to offer them
plea deals in the interest of expediency.
Extralegal Variables
Along with the legally relevant variables discussed above, several extralegal variables,
shown at the bottom of Table 2, are also associated with statistically significant differences in
sentence outcomes.9 Age has a positive correlation with sentence length. Young inmates (14 to
24 years of age) have sentences that are about 7 percent shorter, and the oldest group (55 and up)
have 6 percent longer sentences compared to those between 25 and 54 years of age, even when
9

The variable representing year admitted has a significant negative coefficient (β = -0.206, p = 0.000), but this most
likely reflects the sample selection bias discussed above; inmates with shorter sentences who entered in the latter
part of the time period from 2002-2006 are more likely to remain in the data sample, while many of those who
entered earlier had been released before August 31, 2006. For the purposes of this analysis, the year variable serves
as a control for underlying trends over time, but the coefficients associated with it are not substantively meaningful.
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the number of serious and violent priors is controlled.10 This finding is inconsistent with existing
research that has found a curvilinear relationship between age and both sentence length and
likelihood of incarceration (Steffensmeier et al. 1995). One possible explanation is that older
offenders may receive leniency earlier in the criminal justice process, so only the worst elderly
criminals end up behind bars.11 Older offenders may also have longer prior records including not
only serious and violent offenses (which were controlled), but other offenses. Combined with
California’s relatively inflexible determinate sentencing structure and mandatory minimum
sentencing policies, this may make it difficult for judges to justify sentences below the
presumptive terms.
Compared to whites, African-American inmates receive 6.6 percent longer sentences,
with offense type, prior record, age, and other factors are held constant. This finding is
consistent with prior research conducted with data from Pennsylvania (Steffensmeier et al. 1998)
and the federal court system (Kautt 2001-2002; Mustard 2001; Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002).
Disproportionalities in sentence length are probably one among many reasons why black inmates
comprise 29 percent of the state’s inmate population, although they only make up 6 percent of
the state’s population (Hayes 2011).
In contrast, Latinos’ sentences were not found to differ significantly from whites’. This
finding is consistent with those of studies that detect greater sentencing disparities for blacks
than for Latinos (Bushway and Piehl 2001; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Chen 2008), though
other researchers, using data from Pennsylvania, Washington and the federal court system, have
found significant sentencing disadvantages for Latino offenders (Steffensmeier and Demuth
2000; Engen et al. 2003; Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002). State-to-state demographic differences
10

The same trend of longer sentences for older offenders is present when five or six age group dummies are used,
rather than three.
11
The fact that only 3 percent of the data sample were 55 and older seems to support this idea.
13

may account for some of inconsistencies between the present findings and those from other
states. The Latino population may be large enough in California that Latinos are no longer
perceived or treated as “minorities” in the justice system. Latinos are not overrepresented in
California’s prison population to the same extent as African-Americans. They make up over 36
percent of the state’s population (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), a greater share than in any other
state except New Mexico (U.S. Census Bureau 2001), and about 40 percent of the male prison
population (Hayes 2011). Temporal differences may also matter. The data used in earlier
studies that find sentencing disparities for Latinos are mostly from the 1990’s.12 The Latino
population in the United States grew 57 percent from 1990 to 2000 and another 43 percent from
2000 to 2010, representing over half of the growth in the U.S. population (Passel et al. 2011). As
the Latino population continues its rapid growth, opportunities will increase for further
examination of these conjectures.
Model 3: Fully Conditional Model
Model 3 includes all of the individual-level covariates from the Model 2, and adds
county-level and selected cross-level covariates corresponding to the hypotheses regarding
contextual effects.13 The county-level covariates are dummy variables for small and large court
systems and a continuous variable for the number of court cases per deputy District Attorney, to
test the organizational maintenance framework; the percentage of registered Republicans to test
the political responsiveness hypothesis; the proportions of the population who are AfricanAmerican and Latino and the squares of these terms, to test the racial/ethnic threat theory; and
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Engen, et al. (2003) use data from 1989-92, Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) use data from 1991-93, and
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000)’s are from 1993-96.
13
Black and Latino are estimated with random effects. This specification is justified by the statistically significant
variance (p ≤ 0.001) associated with the slopes for Black and Latino. A model comparison test of the fixed- and
random-intercepts models, using deviance statistics, confirms the choice of a model with random-effects for these
variables (χ2 = 39.77, 5 degrees of freedom, p = 0.000).
14

the unemployment rate and the violent crime rate, to test for economic and crime threat effects.14
The cross-level covariates are interactions between African-American and Latino at the
individual level and the racial/ethnic and crime threat variables at the county level. The results
of this analysis are shown in Table 3.
The coefficients associated with the individual-level variables remain almost unchanged
between Models 2 and 3. Only one changes by more than 0.01: the coefficient on Latino, which
goes from -0.002 to -0.024 and becomes statistically significant (p = 0.043). This suggests that
Latino offenders may receive slightly shorter sentences than whites when the other factors in the
model are controlled. A comparison test of Models 2 and 3 using deviance statistics finds an
improvement in fit associated with the addition of county-level and cross-level covariates (χ2 =
79.3, 21 d.f., p = 0.000). The level-2 variance component shrinks more (τ = 0.00482), but
remains significant (p = 0.000). The addition of county- and cross-level variables to the model
explains 28 percent of the remaining between-unit variance from Model 2.15
***Table 3 about here ***
Contextual Factors: Effects of Administrative and Political Environments
The analysis of county-level variables yields some support for the organizational
maintenance hypothesis. Prior studies have found that a lower likelihood of incarceration and
shorter sentence lengths in larger courts (e.g. Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Dixon 1995). The results
from Model 3 indicate that sentences tend to be about 4.9 percent longer in small court systems
than in medium-sized systems (p = 0.041). Small court systems are in place in about threequarters of the counties in California, but together they handle only about 19 percent of the cases

14

All of the continuous variables are entered into the model in grand-mean-centered form. Dummy variables are
entered uncentered.
15
(0.0067 – 0.00482) / 0.0067 = 0.2806
15

filed in the state.16 However, sentences in large court systems are not significantly shorter than
in medium-sized systems. This may be due to the correlation between the small and large court
dummies as well as anomalous characteristics of the three counties (Los Angeles, Orange, and
San Diego Counties) that fall into the “large” category, with 100 or more judges. When the size
of the court system is controlled, court caseload (cases per deputy D.A.) is not significant.
Contrary to what the political responsiveness hypothesis predicts, the analysis did not
find significantly longer sentences in counties where the population supported the Republican
candidate for President. This finding confirms those of several recent studies using multilevel
methods (Johnson 2005; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Weidner et al. 2005; Schanzenbach 2005).
Some prior research has found a positive relationship between political conservatism and
incarceration rate, but the use of non-hierarchical methods on nested data may have led to
overestimates of the effect of political environment on incarceration. Tests of alternative
measures of political conservatism and anti-crime sentiment, including percentage voting for
Bush over Kerry in 2004 and percentage voting for Three Strikes in 1994 or against an
amendment that would amend Three Strikes in 2006, produced similarly non-significant results.
The finding that political environment has no clear effect on sentencing outcomes may
comfort those who believe that the courts should remain separate from the influence of political
pressures. It may indicate that District Attorneys and judges, who run in nonpartisan political
races in California, are relatively insulated from party politics. The possibility remains,
however, that effects of political context on sentencing exist despite the findings presented here.
Some effects could be masked by the inclusion of certain control variables. For example, in the
model above, Three Strikes status is controlled, and both third-striker and second-striker status

16

Calculated using 2005 data on county court caseload and personnel
(http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof05/index.htm).
16

have strong and significant positive effects on sentence length. Studies have discussed the
substantial role of prosecutorial and judicial discretion in the application of mandatory minimum
sentencing policies at the federal level and in the states (Lowenthal 1993; Bjerk 2005; Benekos
and Merlo 1995). Three Strikes implementation is known to vary widely from county to county
in California (Bowers 2001; Walsh 2004), and some scholars have asserted that local political
climate affects how individuals are charged by prosecutors under California’s Three Strikes law
in different counties (Zimring et al. 2001). The uniformity in sentence lengths imposed by a
statutory determinate sentencing system may be offset in part by the exercise of prosecutorial or
judicial discretion in the application of Three Strikes and other mandatory minimum sentences.
The extent to which political context and other aspects of the sentencing environment influence
the implementation of Three Strikes in California is the subject of a separate investigation by this
author (citation omitted).
Racial/Ethnic, Economic, and Crime Threat
The county-level and cross-level analyses provided no evidence to support either the
general or race-specific racial or ethnic threat hypotheses. Sentence lengths are not significantly
longer for the whole population of offenders, or for blacks or Latinos, in locations where
African-American or Latino populations are larger. Unemployment rate also was not significant,
contradicting the idea that punishment in the form of increased sentence length is used as a
response to economic threat.
The analyses of main effects (as opposed to interaction effects) did not support the crime
threat hypothesis. In fact, the coefficient representing the main effect of violent crime rate was
statistically significant at p < 0.05, but in the opposite direction than expected. This might
indicate that prosecutors, juries, and judges are more likely to respond to crime with harsh
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sentences in environments where violent crime is less commonplace.17 The analysis of crosslevel interactions does reveal evidence of race- and ethnicity-specific crime threat effects. An
increase in the violent crime rate is associated with statistically significant increases in sentence
length for both African-Americans and Latinos, indicating that efforts to “get tough on crime”
may have disproportionate effects on nonwhites. However, these effects are small and the effect
for African-Americans is only borderline significant: in response to a one percent increase in the
violent crime rate per 1000 residents, we see a 1.1 percent increase in sentence length for blacks
(p = 0.086), and a 1.5 percent increase for Latinos (p = 0.019).
Table 4 lists the hypotheses tested in this paper, the effects predicted by these hypotheses,
and a summary of whether the findings confirmed the predictions.
***Table 4 about here ***
Conclusions
The findings of this paper have both substantive and methodological implications for
research on the extent and sources of sentencing disparities in the United States. The numerous
legally relevant factors tested in the model above explain most of the variation in sentence
lengths, but some variation remains that can be attributed to other sources. This study finds that
some characteristics of the organizational and social context affect sentencing outcomes, but the
relationships between context and outcomes are more nuanced than what “one size fits all”
theory might predict.
The multilevel analysis finds no evidence that measures of political context affect
sentence lengths. While this finding may not be substantively exciting, it illustrates a
methodological point. Hierarchical models allow researchers to measure the effects of case-level
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When a rural-urban code for each county is introduced to the model, the coefficient on violent crime is still
negative, but no longer statistically significant (p = 0.105). The “rural” variable itself is not significant.
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and group-level variables simultaneously, while avoiding misspecification of standard errors due
to ignored correlation between error terms for clustered cases (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Luke
2004). In earlier studies, the lack of correction for correlated standard errors for offenders
clustered within subsets such as district court circuits may have resulted in overestimation of the
significance of contextual variables such as those representing the political environment. More
recent work using multilevel methods has consistently found non-significant estimates of the
effect of local political conservatism on sentence lengths, departure from sentencing guidelines,
and the likelihood of incarceration (see, for example, Johnson 2005, 2006).
While the data used in the analysis presented above are extensive, they originate from a
single state. Questions may arise regarding the extent to which the findings here can be
generalized. One could argue that research on California’s criminal justice system is intrinsically
valuable. California’s population comprises nearly 12 percent of the U.S. population and is
larger than the populations of all but 32 nations (Johnson 2003). The state’s approximately
170,000 prison inmates constitute about 12 percent of state prisoners in the United States, and
California’s correctional institutions house more inmates than the prison systems of most
countries (Walmsley 2009). In addition, the analyses here serve to extend a body of research on
sentencing outcomes using multilevel methods that has thus far focused mainly the federal court
system (Kautt 2002; Ulmer 2005; Johnson et al. 2008) and a handful of states with sentencing
guidelines commissions, including Pennsylvania (e.g. Britt 2000; Johnson 2005, 2006; Ulmer
and Johnson 2004), Minnesota (e.g. Dixon 1995; Stolzenberg and D'Alessio 1994; Miethe 1987),
and Washington (e.g. Engen and Gainey 2000; Engen et al. 2003). Many of the findings support
conclusions from earlier studies using similar methods on data from entirely different sources.
Taken together, this study and others preceding it provide strong and encouraging evidence that
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legally relevant variables have much greater influence on sentencing decisions than extralegal
factors. They also confirm that geographic disparities exist that cannot be fully explained by a
broad range of legally relevant factors. The observation that sentence lengths for some or all
defendants may be determined in part by county demographics, administrative characteristics, or
other contextual factors that are well beyond the control of defendants calls into question the
presumption of equal justice under the law. Offenders with similar criminal records, who
commit comparable offenses, can – and do – receive significantly different prison sentences
depending on where which their court cases are adjudicated.
This study and others provide evidence in support of the organizational maintenance
framework. Findings regarding racial and ethnic threat have been mixed, and there has been less
support in the recent literature for the notion that political motivations contribute significantly to
inter-jurisdictional disparities in sentence lengths.
The absence of observed effects of political, economic, and demographic climate on
sentence lengths may be attributable in large part to the rigidity of California’s statutory
sentencing structure and the sentencing guidelines structures in other states where effects have
not been found. Scholars have written about the “hydraulic displacement of discretion” in the
criminal justice system: when discretion is severely curtailed in one part of the system, it tends to
resurface elsewhere (Miethe 1987; McCoy 1984; Woolredge and Griffin 2005). This may be the
case in California. Due to data limitations, this study has focused on sentence length, but prior
research has determined that much unwarranted sentencing disparity is found at earlier stages of
the courtroom process, including the filing and dropping of charges (Shermer and Johnson 2010)
and the decision about whether or not to incarcerate (Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Johnson 2006;
Pardoe and Weidner 2006; Chiricos and Crawford 1995). If detailed courtroom data become
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available in California, future research should investigate the individual- and jurisdictional-level
factors that influence these processes as well.
Especially troubling is the finding that extralegal individual characteristics, such as race
and age, influence sentencing leniency or severity beyond the extent to which they are correlated
with legally relevant attributes of offenders and their crimes. In particular, African-American
offenders appear to be significantly disadvantaged. It is uncertain whether this is due to overt or
unconscious discrimination, institutional bias, defendants’ relative unwillingness to negotiate
with prosecutors, or other reasons. Although the presence of African-American sentencing
disadvantage is well-documented, little is known about the sources of racial disparity in criminal
charging and sentencing, and more research in sorely needed this area.
A somewhat puzzling finding is that Latinos do not appear to experience the same
sentencing disadvantages that African-Americans do, and that they may even receive sentences
that are shorter than whites’ when several factors are controlled. The reasons behind the
apparent differences in sentence lengths between black and Latino felons in California remain
uncertain and deserve further exploration through quantitative or qualitative research. The
disparities may reflect differences in criminal justice decisionmakers’ perceptions and treatment
of blacks, whites, and Latinos, or distinctions between the groups not captured in the data used
here, such as differences in plea bargaining patterns.
Policy Implications
Some proponents of criminal justice reform, including California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger (2009) and the Little Hoover Commission (2007), an independent and
bipartisan state oversight agency, have called for the creation of a sentencing commission
consisting of experts, policy makers, and elected officials to review sentencing data, proposals,
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policies, and outcomes. Others suggest that more structured presumptive sentencing guidelines
may increase uniformity in sentencing (Hayes 2006), though evidence from Pennsylvania and
the federal courts indicates that such a system may be insufficient to eliminate geographic
disparity in sentencing (Johnson 2006; Johnson et al. 2008). Critical legal scholars have called
for greater transparency in prosecutorial and judicial decision-making and the allocation of more
resources and energy to careful study and systematic analysis of criminal justice processes and
outcomes to reduce sentencing disparities, especially those associated with race (Bandes 2006;
Davis 2007). Increased availability of detailed criminal justice data from the courts, including
information about prosecutors’ decisions to file or drop charges and to negotiate plea deals,
could shed light on sources of interjurisdictional variation in sentencing outcomes as well as on
racial and ethnic disparities. The need for proposals like these to be considered seriously is
confirmed by the findings of this study.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Minimum Maximum
Individual-level Variables (N = 93033)
Sentence Length in Months (truncated past 600
months)
Offense Categories
1st degree murder
2nd degree murder
Manslaughter
Vehicular Manslaughter
Robbery
Assault with a deadly weapon
Rape
Lewd act with a child
Kidnapping
(Reference = other assault)
Burglary - 1st degree
Burglary - 2nd degree
Grand theft
Petty theft with a prior
Receiving stolen property
Vehicle theft
Forgery or fraud
Possession of controlled substances
Possession of controlled substances for sale
Sale of controlled substances
Manufacture of controlled substances
Possession of marijuana for sale
Marijuana sales
Number of serious or violent prior convictions
Second Striker
Third Striker
New prison admission (non-parolee)
Current offense charged as a parole violation
with new prison term
Parolee - returned to custody
(continued on next page)
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Std.
Mean Deviation

8

600

85.36

104.09

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
94
1
1
1
1

0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.11
0.08
0.09
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.02
0.12
0.10
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.50
0.24
0.02
0.60
0.27

0.13
0.15
0.12
0.07
0.32
0.28
0.29
0.10
0.22
0.09
0.20
0.22
0.15
0.19
0.18
0.23
0.14
0.32
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.08
0.06
1.27
0.43
0.12
0.49
0.44

0

1

0.13

0.33

Minimum Maximum
0
0
0
0
0
0
2002
0
0
0
0
0

Black/African-American
Hispanic/Latino
White
Age 14-24
Age 25-54
Age 55 and up
Year of incarceration
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
County-Level Variables (N = 58)
Percentage of Republican registered voters
Caseload per Deputy D.A.
Small Court System (1-20 judges)
Medium-sized system (21-99 judges)
Large Court System (100 or more judges)
Unemployment Rate
% African-American
% Latino
% White
Violent Crime Rate

11.54
2.00
0
0
0
4.60
0.16
3.97
48.71
182.40
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Mean

1
0.28
1
0.43
1
0.29
1
0.25
1
0.72
1
0.03
2006 2004.93
1
0.07
1
0.09
1
0.27
1
0.27
1
0.44
51.80
186.85
1
1
1
15.00
14.93
72.22
94.18
912.90

38.91
76.63
0.74
0.21
0.05
7.64
3.40
22.94
72.74
429.49

Std.
Deviation
0.45
0.49
0.45
0.43
0.45
0.17
1.23
0.25
0.29
0.45
0.45
0.50
9.42
42.07
0.44
0.41
0.22
2.39
3.56
15.25
13.74
174.12

Table 2: Model with Individual-level Variables Only: Dependent variable = ln (sentence in
months)

Intercept
Legally Relevant Variables
Offense Categories
1st degree murder
2nd degree murder
Manslaughter
Vehicular Manslaughter
Robbery
Assault with a deadly weapon
Rape
Lewd act with a child
Kidnapping
(Reference = other assault)
Burglary - 1st degree
Burglary - 2nd degree
Grand theft
Petty theft with a prior
Receiving stolen property
Vehicle theft
Forgery or fraud
Possession of controlled substances
Possession of controlled substances for sale
Sale of controlled substances
Manufacture of controlled substances
Possession of marijuana for sale
Marijuana sales
Number of serious or violent prior convictions
Second Striker
Third Striker
(Reference = no "strikes")
Current offense charged as a parole violation
with new prison term
Parolee - returned to custody
(Reference = non-parolee)
(continued on next page)
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Coefficient
417.033

Standard
Error
3.392

Pvalue
eβ
0.000 1.30E+181

1.914
1.323
0.906
0.551
0.386
0.282
0.847
0.543
0.801

0.015
0.013
0.015
0.026
0.007
0.008
0.018
0.010
0.021

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

6.778
3.754
2.475
1.736
1.472
1.326
2.333
1.722
2.229

0.197
-0.345
-0.346
-0.420
-0.384
-0.307
-0.284
-0.453
0.008
0.179
0.388
-0.510
-0.188
0.035
0.318
1.517

0.010
0.009
0.013
0.010
0.011
0.009
0.014
0.007
0.007
0.010
0.019
0.022
0.029
0.002
0.005
0.015

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.256
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.217
0.708
0.708
0.657
0.681
0.735
0.753
0.635
1.008
1.196
1.475
0.601
0.829
1.036
1.374
4.558

-0.025
-0.179

0.004
0.006

0.000
0.000

0.976
0.836

Coefficient
Extralegal variables
Black
Latino
Age 14-24
(Reference = 25-54)
Age 55 and up
Year admitted
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Standard PError
value

eβ

0.064
-0.002
-0.070

0.005
0.005
0.004

0.000
0.660
0.000

1.066
0.998
0.933

0.055
-0.206

0.011
0.002

0.000
0.000

1.056
0.814

Table 3: Model with Individual-level, County-level, and Cross-level Variables: Dependent
variable = ln (sentence in months)

Intercept
County-level Variables
Political context
Percentage of Republican registered voters
Administrative Context
Caseload per Deputy D.A. (x10)
Small Court System (1-20 judges)
(Reference = Medium-sized system (21-99
judges)
Large Court System (100 or more judges)
Economic Threat
Unemployment Rate
Racial/Ethnic Threat
% African-American
(% African-American)
% Latino

2

(% Latino)2
Crime Threat
Violent Crime Rate (crimes / 1000 residents)
Individual-level Variables
Legally Relevant Variables
Offense Categories
1st degree murder
2nd degree murder
Manslaughter
Vehicular Manslaughter
Robbery
Assault with a deadly weapon
Rape
Lewd act with a child
Kidnapping
(Reference = other assault)
(continued on next page)
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Coefficient
416.700

Standard
Error
3.391

Pvalue
eβ
0.000 9.34E+180

0.001

0.001

0.361

1.001

-0.002
0.049

0.000
0.023

0.305
0.041

0.998
1.051

-0.005

0.042

0.914

0.995

-0.002

0.005

0.738

0.998

-0.005

0.005

0.302

0.995

0.002
0.001

0.001
0.001

0.035
0.496

1.002
1.001

0.000

0.000

0.535

1.000

-0.164

0.000

0.043

0.849

1.913
1.323
0.907
0.553
0.387
0.282
0.849
0.544
0.801

0.015
0.013
0.015
0.026
0.007
0.008
0.018
0.010
0.021

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

6.771
3.754
2.476
1.738
1.472
1.326
2.336
1.723
2.228

Coefficient
0.197
-0.345
-0.346
-0.420
-0.383
-0.307
-0.284
-0.453
0.009
0.178
0.391
-0.511
-0.189
0.035
0.318
1.516

Standard
Error
0.010
0.009
0.013
0.010
0.011
0.009
0.014
0.007
0.007
0.010
0.019
0.022
0.029
0.002
0.005
0.015

Pvalue
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.243
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

eβ
1.217
0.708
0.708
0.657
0.682
0.736
0.753
0.636
1.009
1.195
1.478
0.600
0.827
1.036
1.374
4.555

-0.024
-0.179

0.004
0.006

0.000
0.000

0.976
0.836

0.054
-0.024
-0.070

0.013
0.012
0.004

0.000
0.043
0.000

1.055
0.976
0.932

0.055
-0.206

0.011
0.002

0.000
0.000

1.056
0.814

0.001

0.004

0.710

1.001

Black x (% African-American)
Black x Violent Crime Rate (per 1000 residents)
Latino x % Latino

-0.001
0.011
0.000

0.001
0.000
0.001

0.248
0.086
0.622

0.999
1.011
1.000

Latino x (% Latino)2
Latino x Violent Crime Rate (per 1000 residents)

0.000
0.015

0.000
0.000

0.427
0.019

1.000
1.015

Burglary - 1st degree
Burglary - 2nd degree
Grand theft
Petty theft with a prior
Receiving stolen property
Vehicle theft
Forgery or fraud
Possession of controlled substances
Possession of controlled substances for sale
Sale of controlled substances
Manufacture of controlled substances
Possession of marijuana for sale
Marijuana sales
Number of serious or violent prior convictions
Second Striker
Third Striker
(Reference = no "strikes")
Current offense charged as a parole violation
with new prison term
Parolee - returned to custody
(Reference = non-parolee)
Extralegal variables
Black
Latino
Age 14-24
(Reference = 25-54)
Age 55 and up
Year admitted
Cross-level Interactions
Black x % African-American
2
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Table 4: Summary of Findings
Variable and Corresponding Hypothesis

Predicted effect

Confirmed?

“Legally relevant” defendant characteristics
will play a substantial role in sentence
outcomes (substantive rationality)

(+) effects for violent
offenses, number of
priors, offense
severity, 2nd or 3rd
strikers; (-) effects for
property offenses,
parolee status

Yes, all legally relevant
variables have strong
significant effects as
expected

African-American offenders will receive
longer sentences than whites (substantive
rationality)

(+) effect for Black

Yes

Latino offenders will receive longer
sentences than whites (substantive
rationality)

(+) effect for Latino

No

Sentences will be longer in counties with a
higher percentage of Republican voters
(political responsiveness)

(+) effect for %
Republican

No

Longer sentences will be administered in
smaller court systems (organizational
maintenance)

(+) effect for small
court system

Yes

Shorter sentences will be administered in
larger court systems (organizational
maintenance)

(-) effect for large
court system

No

Courts with higher caseloads will administer (-) effect for court
shorter sentences (organizational
cases per D.A.
maintenance)

No

In areas where the black population is
larger, sentences will be longer (racial threat,
general); effect may diminish where black
share of the population is high (racial threat)

(+) effect for
% Black in county; (-)
effect for
(% Black)2

No

In areas where black population is larger,
black defendants will receive longer
sentences, and the effect will be curvilinear
(racial threat, specific)

(+) effect for (Black *
% Black; (-)
coefficient on [Black
* (% Black)2]

No
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Variable and Corresponding Hypothesis

Predicted effect

Confirmed?

In areas where the Latino population is
larger, sentences will be longer (ethnic
threat, general); effect will diminish where
Latino share of the population is high.

(+) effect for
% Latino in county;
(-) effect for
(% Latino)2

No

In areas where the Latino population is
larger, Latinos will receive longer sentences,
and the effect will be curvilinear in form
(ethnic threat, specific)

(+) effect for (Latino
* % Latino; (-)
coefficient on [Latino
* (% Latino)2]

No

Economic threat: sentences will be longer
where the unemployment rate is higher.

(+) effect for county
unemployment rate

No

Crime threat: sentences will be longer where
the crime rate is higher.

(+) effect for county
crime rate

No effect for whites;
borderline significant
(+) effect for blacks;
significant (+) effect for
Latinos

30

References
Alschuler, Albert W. 2005. "Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines." Stanford Law Review 58:85-118.
Bandes, Susan. 2006. "Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision."
Howard Law Journal 49.
Beckett, Katherine. 1997. Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American
Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Benekos, Peter J. , and Alida V. Merlo. 1995. "Three Strikes and You're Out!: The Political
Sentencing Game." Federal Probation 59:3-9.
Bibas, Stephanos. 2006. "Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure." New York
University Law Review 81:911-966.
Bjerk, David. 2005. "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing." The Journal of Law and Economics 48:591625.
Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc.
Bowers, Joshua E. 2001. "The Integrity of the Game is Everything: The Problem of Geographic
Disparity in Three Strikes." New York University Law Review 76:1164-1203.
Box, Steven, and Chris Hale. 1982. "Economic Crisis and the Rising Prisoner Population in
England and Wales " Crime and Social Justice 17:20-35.
———. 1985. "Unemployment, Imprisonment and Prison Overcrowding " Crime, Law and
Social Change 9:209-228.
Britt, Chester L. 2000. "Social Context and Racial Disparities in Punishment Decisions." Justice
Quarterly 17:707 - 732.
Bushway, Shawn, and Anne M. Piehl. 2001. "Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and
Racial Discrimination in Sentencing." Law & Society Review 35:733-764.
Chen, Elsa Y. 2008. "The Liberation Hypothesis and Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the
Application of California’s Three Strikes Law." Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice
6:83-102.
Chiricos, Ted, and Charles Crawford. 1995. "Race and Imprisonment: A Contextual Assessment
of the Evidence " Pp. in Darnell F. Hawkins ed., Ethnicity, Race, and Crime:
Perspectives across Time and Place. Albany: State University of New York Press.

31

Chiricos, Theodore G., and Miriam A. Delone. 1992. "Labor Surplus and Punishment: A Review
and Assessment of Theory and Evidence." Social Problems 39:421-446.
Crawford, Charles. 2000. "Gender, Race, and Habitual Offender Sentencing in Florida."
Criminology 38:263-280.
Crawford, Charles, Ted Chiricos, and Gary Kleck. 1998. "Race, Racial Threat, and Sentencing of
Habitual Offenders." Criminology 36:481-511.
Crow, Matthew S., and Kathrine A. Johnson. 2008. "Race, Ethnicity, and Habitual-Offender
Sentencing: A Multilevel Analysis of Individual and Contextual Threat." Criminal
Justice Policy Review 19:63-83.
Davis, Angela J. 2007. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Demuth, Stephen, and Darrell Steffensmeier. 2004. "Ethnicity Effects on Sentence Outcomes in
Large Urban Courts: Comparisons Among White, Black, and Hispanic Defendants."
Social Science Quarterly 85:994-1011.
Dixon, Jo. 1995. "The Organizational Context of Criminal Sentencing." The American Journal of
Sociology 100:1157-1198.
Eisenstein, James, Roy B. Flemming, and Peter F. Nardulli. 1988. The Contours of Justice:
Communities and Their Courts. Boston: Little, Brown.
Eitle, David, Stewart J. D'Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg. 2002. "Racial Threat and Social
Control: A Test of the Political, Economic, and Threat of Black Crime Hypotheses."
Social Forces 81:557-576.
Engen, Rodney, and Randy Gainey. 2000. "Modeling the Effects of Legally Relevant and
Extralegal Factors under Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed." Criminology
38:1207-1230.
Engen, Rodney, Randy Gainey, Robert D. Crutchfield, and Joseph Weis. 2003. "Discretion and
Disparity under Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Departures and Structured
Sentencing Alternatives." Criminology 41:99-130.
Everett, Ronald S., and Roger A. Wojtkiewicz. 2002. "Difference, Disparity, and Race/Ethnic
Bias in Federal Sentencing." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 18:189 - 211.
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. New York: Pantheon
Books.
Gordon, Sanford A., and Gregory A. Huber. 2002. "Citizen Oversight and the Electoral
Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors." American Journal of Political Science 46:334-351.

32

Hayes, Joseph M. 2011. California's Changing Prison Population. Public Policy Institute of
California. San Francisco.
Hayes, Sean. 2006. "The End of Determinate Sentencing: How California's Prison Problem Can
Be Solved With Quick Fixes and a Long Term Commission." Pp., Working Papers.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University - Criminal Justice Center.
Helms, Ronald, and David Jacobs. 2002. "The Political Context of Sentencing: An Analysis of
Community and Individual Determinants." Social Forces 81:577-604.
Huang, W.S. Wilson, Mary A. Finn, R. Barry Ruback, and Robert R. Friedmann. 1996.
"Individual and Contextual Influences on Sentence Lengths: Examining Political
Conservatism." The Prison Journal 76:398-419.
Huber, Gregory A., and Sanford A. Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice
Blind When It Runs for Office?" American Journal of Political Science 48:247-263.
Jacobs, David, and Jason T. Carmichael. 2001. "The Politics of Punishment across Time and
Space: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Imprisonment Rates." Social Forces 80:61-91.
Jacobs, David, and Ronald E. Helms. 1996. "Toward a Political Model of Incarceration: A TimeSeries Examination of Multiple Explanations for Prison Admission Rates " American
Journal of Sociology 102:323-357.
Johnson, Brian D. 2005. "Contextual Disparities in Guideline Departures: Courtroom Social
Contexts, Guidelines Compliance, and Extralegal Disparities in Criminal Sentencing."
Criminology 43:761-796.
———. 2006. "The Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating Judge and County
Level Influences in the Study of Courtroom Decision Making." Criminology 44:259-298.
Johnson, Brian D., Jeffery Ulmer, and John H. Kramer. 2008. "The Social Context of Guidelines
Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts." Criminology 46:737-783.
Johnson, Hans P. 2003. California’s Demographic Future. Public Policy Institute of California.
San Francisco, CA.
Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts. 2007. CJER Felony
Sentencing Handbook. Oakland, CA: Continuing Education of the Bar, California.
Kautt, Paula. 2001-2002. "Differential Usage of Guideline Standards by Defendant Race and
Gender in Federal Drug Sentences: Fact or Fiction?" Federal Sentencing Reporter
14:159-164.
———. 2002. "Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation in
Sentencing Outcomes for Drug-Trafficking Offenders." Justice Quarterly 19:633-671.
Kennedy, Randall. 1997. Race, Crime, and the Law. New York: Pantheon Books.
33

Kreft, Ita G., and Jan de Leeuw. 1998. Introducing Multilevel Modeling London: Sage.
Little Hoover Commission. 2007. Solving California’s Corrections Crisis: Time Is Running Out.
Milton Marks "Little Hoover" Commission on California State Government Organization
and Economy. Sacramento, CA.
Lowenthal, Gary T. 1993. "Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform." California Law Review 81:61-123.
Luke, Douglas A. 2004. Multilevel Modeling. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mauer, Marc. 2004. "Race, Class and Development of Criminal Justice Policy." Review of Policy
Research 21:79-92.
McCoy, Candace. 1984. "Determinate Sentencing, Plea Bargaining Bans, and Hydraulic
Discretion in California." The Justice System Journal 9:256-275.
Miethe, Terance D. 1987. "Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices under Determinate
Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion." The Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology 78:155-176.
Mustard, David B. 2001. "Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from
the US Federal Courts." The Journal of Law and Economics.
Myers, Martha A, and Susette M. Talarico. 1987. Social Contexts of Criminal Sentencing
Secaucus, NJ: Springer-Verlag.
Pardoe, Iain, and Robert R. Weidner. 2006. "Sentencing Convicted Felons in the United States: a
Bayesian Analysis Using Multilevel Covariates " Journal of Statistical Planning and
Inference 136:1433-1455.
Passel, Jeffrey S., D’Vera Cohn, and Mark Hugo Lopez. 2011. Census 2010: 50 Million Latinos
- Hispanics Account for More Than Half of Nation’s Growth in Past Decade Pew
Hispanic Center. Washington, DC.
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. Hierarchical Linear Models:
Applications and Data Analysis Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Savelsberg, Joachim J. 1992. "Law That Does Not Fit Society: Sentencing Guidelines as a
Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of Substantivized Law." American Journal of
Sociology 97:1346-1381.
Schanzenbach, Max M. 2005. "Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of
District-Level Judicial Demographics." The Journal of Legal Studies 34:57-92.
Schwarzenegger, Arnold. 2009. "Sentencing Reform: Governor Schwarzenegger’s Proposal Ending arbitrary sentencing." Pp. Sacramento, CA: State of California, Office of the
Governor.
34

Shermer, Lauren O'Neill, and Brian D. Johnson. 2010. "Criminal Prosecutions: Examining
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts." Justice
Quarterly 27:394-430.
Smith, Kevin B. 2004. "The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of
Incarceration Rates." The Journal of Politics 66:925-938.
Steffensmeier, Darrell, and Stephen Demuth. 2000. "Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in US
Federal courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?" American Sociological Review 65:705729.
Steffensmeier, Darrell, John Kramer, and Jeffery Ulmer. 1995. "Age Differences in Sentencing."
Justice Quarterly 12:583-602.
Steffensmeier, Darrell, Jeffrey Ulmer, and John Kramer. 1998. "The Interaction of Race, Gender,
and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and
Male." Criminology 36:763–798.
Stolzenberg, Lisa, and Stewart J. D'Alessio. 1994. "Sentencing and Unwarranted Disparity: An
Empirical Assessment of the Long-Term Impact of Sentencing Guidelines." Criminology
32:301-310.
Taylor, Marylee C. 1998. "How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local
Populations: Numbers Count." American Sociological Review 63:512-535.
Tonry, Michael H. 1995. Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America. New York:
Oxford University Press.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2001. Population by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the United
States, Regions, Divisions, States, Puerto Rico, and Places of 100,000 or More
Population (PHC-T-6).
———. 2010. "California QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau." Pp.
Ulmer, Jeffery T. 2005. "The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S.
District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order." Symbolic Interaction 28:255-279.
Ulmer, Jeffery T., and Mindy Bradley. 2006. "Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious
Violent Offenses." Criminology 44:631-670.
Ulmer, Jeffery T., and Brian D. Johnson. 2004. "Sentencing In Context: A Multilevel Analysis."
Criminology 42:137-177.
Ulmer, Jeffery T., Megan C. Kurlychek, and John H. Kramer. 2007. "Prosecutorial Discretion
and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences." Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 44:427-458.

35

Walmsley, Roy. 2009. World Prison Population List (Eighth Edition). King's College London.
International Centre for Prison Studies. London, England.
Walsh, Jennifer Edwards. 2004. Tough for Whom? How Prosecutors and Judges Use Their
Discretion to Promote Justice Under the California Three-Strikes Law. The Henry
Salvatori Center for the Study of Individual Freedom in the Modern World, Claremont
McKenna College. Claremont, CA.
Watson, Stephanie. 2008. "Fixing California Sentencing Law - The Problem with Piecemeal
Reform." McGeorge Law Review 39 585-601.
Weidner, Robert R., Richard S. Frase, and Jennifer S. Schultz. 2005. "The Impact of Contextual
Factors on the Decision to Imprison in Large Urban Jurisdictions: A Multilevel
Analysis." Crime & Delinquency 51:400-424.
Woolredge, John, and Timothy Griffin. 2005. "Displaced Discretion under Ohio Sentencing
Guidelines." Journal of Criminal Justice 33:301-316.
Zimring, Franklin E., Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin. 2001. Punishment and Democracy:
Three Strikes and You're Out in California. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

36

